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Abstract Outcontracting is a growing practice by govern-
ments as well as by nongovernmental organizations engaged 
in emergency management. Understanding the role of the 
private sector in providing equipment and services is critical 
in ensuring that emergency management is carried out as 
effectively and efficiently as possible in the best interest of the 
affected population. This inquiry looks at the types of services 
that the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) contracts out to both for-profit and not-for-profit orga-
nizations and examines the reviews that these services have 
received by government itself, interest groups, and disaster 
scientists. The article concludes with an overview of specific 
functional areas, where the services of either for-profits or 
not-for-profits are most appropriate in relation to their areas 
of expertise. The implication drawn from the analysis is that 
contractors’ motivations and expertise need to be clearly 
understood when awarding government contracts in order to 
respond effectively to disaster needs and meet taxpayers’ 
expectations. 
Keywords emergency management, FEMA, for-profit con-
tractor, government outcontracting, not-for-profit contractor, 
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1 Introduction
The trend of outcontracting has long been an established 
practice both in the private sector as well as in government. 
Over the past decade, outcontracting has progressively per-
meated virtually every function of emergency management. 
Not only government agencies but also increasingly not-for-
profit organizations working in emergency and disaster man-
agement are making use of outside contractors for specific 
technical services and expertise in time-limited projects. The 
practice of outcontracting—traditionally already surrounded 
by controversy—has been accompanied by a particularly 
intense debate in the field of emergency management. 
Employing services only when needed, better cost effec-
tiveness, and limiting liability are some of the key arguments 
of supporters of contracting out services. Critics insist that 
this practice poses a threat to such fundamental pillars of 
emergency management as, for example, accountability 
and institutional memory. Are contractors indeed more 
cost-effective? Considering the range of technical expertise 
required for most projects, does it make sense to employ 
personnel full time when they may not be needed all year 
round? Beyond these financial and contractual issues, there 
is a more fundamental ideological question: is it ethical to 
profit from the misery of disaster-affected populations? Is it 
justifiable to make a profit when that money could make a 
substantial contribution to saving lives and a faster recovery? 
Is it fair that taxpayers’ money or private donations in 
response to a disaster go into the profit pockets of a contrac-
tor? The very foundation of the concept of not-for-profit work 
in emergencies is challenged by the introduction of outcon-
tracting—most controversially among not-for-profits now 
using for-profit contractors themselves.
This debate on the use of for-profit and not-for-profit con-
tractors is not only an academic exercise. It poses a dilemma 
for emergency managers who are accountable to taxpayers 
and donors, and who, at the same time, see as their first prior-
ity serving those affected by disasters, which requires making 
the best possible management decisions, often under con-
siderable funding constraints. In addition, organizational 
policies dictate the parameters for the use of contractors, 
thus adding another dimension to the discussion. Emergency 
managers have to carefully weigh the particulars of every 
situation—within the context of public opinion, organizationa l 
policies, administrative rules, and financial considerations—
and determine whether the tasks at hand can be carried out 
by in-house staff, or whether it is more desirable to hire a 
contractor. 
This study examines some key issues surrounding this 
debate with a particular focus on the use of for-profit and 
not-for-profit contractors in emergency management by the 
U.S. government. The first section looks at the advantages 
and disadvantages of using either for-profit or not-for-profit 
contractors. A discussion then follows that highlights where 
they diverge and what consequences this has for specific 
functional areas of emergency management that may be 
better served by one type of contractor over the other. Finally, 
this inquiry concludes with a look into the future and how the 
practice of outcontracting in emergency management is most 
likely to develop.
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2 Government’s Use of For-Profit 
Contractors
Contractors are widely used by government. With an upsurge 
of private companies offering emergency related equipment 
and services, for-profit contractors have over this past decade 
also quickly permeated government entities with a mandate in 
emergency management, notably FEMA. With an inadequate 
number of core staff, according to the findings of the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of the Inspector 
General (DHS 2009), FEMA is only able to meet the demands 
of a disaster by augmenting its capacity virtually instanta-
neously through implementing and stand-by partners. A 
review of active contracts that FEMA currently administers 
reveals that the organization does not only issue contracts 
in times of disasters but also does so for routine tasks. This 
suggests that the agency’s core staff is insufficient to manage 
even day-to-day tasks that fall within the organization’s 
mandate. Of interest in the debate about the use of for-profit 
contractors are consequently the following questions: What 
are the main areas and situations where for-profit contractors 
are employed? What are the key arguments of proponents 
of for-profit contractors in emergency services? And why 
does the government choose for-profit over not-for-profit 
organizations in outcontracting?
As of April 7, 2011, FEMA advertised on its website that 
it administered a total of 490 active contracts (FEMA 2011a). 
Of these, 472—or 96 percent—were with private for-profit 
contractors, while 12 were with academic institutions, 4 
with other local government entities, and 2 with one non-
governmental organization (NGO) working not for profit, 
namely the American Red Cross (Table1).
The majority of the 96 percent of FEMA issued contracts 
that employ private for-profit contractors can be compart-
mentalized into two major categories: (1) support services, 
and (2) FEMA core functions. Under support services, the 
for-profit contractors mainly work in such areas as communi-
cations, project evaluations, records management, adminis-
trative clerical and contracts services, security support 
services, media advertising, business consulting, and report 
support services. Under what may be classified as FEMA core 
functions, these contractors carry out substantive emergency 
response tasks such as providing air and ground ambulances, 
setting up and maintaining mobile homes and mass shelters, 
providing electrical services for staging areas, removing 
snow, engaging in small infrastructure repair projects, and 
conducting exercises and training. FEMA also hires these 
contractors for jobs that would traditionally be handled 
by academia or research institutes. For example, FEMA 
has hired and continues to hire private firms to carry out 
emergency-related studies on climate issues, environmental 
and seismic activities, as well as analyses and reports on 
specific emergency management topics such as volunteer 
firefighters and the scientific mapping of emergency 
environments. 
Moreover, despite FEMA’s denial that it is hiring contrac-
tors for inherently governmental functions that should only 
be carried out by government personnel, the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS 2009, 17) has repeatedly found FEMA in violation: 
Despite these requirements, contract staff are approving 
Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response grant 
payments without FEMA program personnel review and 
approval. Contract staff are also evaluating quarterly status 
reports submitted by Staffing for Adequate Fire and 
Emergency Response grant recipients. Our discussions with 
program and contractor personnel disclosed that Staffing for 
Adequate Fire and Emergency Response contractors have the 
authority to make decisions on payment requests and program 
status, which are prohibited activities according to OMB 
Circular No. A-76. As such, contractors are performing work 
that constitutes inherently governmental functions. FEMA 
has been using contract staff for these inherently governmen-
tal functions since 2006 due to lack of FEMA staff. The Staff-
ing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response program 
manager said that he does not have the time to “look over 
the shoulder” of the contract staff while they are reviewing 
quarterly reports and requests for funds.
This not only highlights the precarious human resources 
situation at FEMA, and demonstrates how consistently it 
relies on contractors to carry out its work, but also reveals 
how deeply contractors have penetrated the institutional 
structure and carry out core governmental functions with 
barely any oversight and accountability. While the discussion 
below looks further into some of these negative implications, 
the focus of this section remains on arguments about why 
it makes sense for FEMA to employ for-profit over not-for-
profit contractors.
As Sylves (2008, 164) and others explain, outcontracting 
is popular with government because “contractors have more 
flexibility and freedom to complete work, and often at less 
cost, than government does.” Disaster management is, in 
essence, largely “seasonal” project work. It is not economical 
for government to retain a large workforce in anticipation of 
a disaster and on permanent and costly employment contracts. 
It makes more economic sense to hire contractors when 
needed. In addition, as disaster management functions are 
becoming increasingly specialized and technical, it is sensible 
to hire contractors with specific skill sets when and where 
required. Some of these skills are indeed hazard-specific, 
such as the ongoing clean-up operation after hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the 
Table 1. Overview of active FEMA contracts as of 7 April 
2011







472 (96.4%) 12 (2.4%) 4 (0.8%) 2 (0.4%)
Note: Data from FEMA 2011a.
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Gulf. Sylves (2008) illustrates how large for-profit contrac-
tors such as Halliburton, Booz Allen Hamilton, Bechtel, and 
the Dewberry Company took over critical emergency 
response functions after Hurricane Katrina, particularly in 
terms of logistics, reconstruction, infrastructure repair, 
telecommunications, and environmental clean-up. In these 
instances, did the government have a real choice between 
hiring a for-profit or not-for-profit contractor?
Not-for-profit organizations generally work to provide 
essential social services to the general public or for a particu-
lar target group, such as the disabled, the elderly, or children. 
Well-known, national not-for-profit organizations engaged in 
emergency work are, for example, CARE, Save the Children, 
Habitat for Humanity, and the Red Cross. Their emergency 
services focus on providing emergency shelter, food, and 
clothing, to mention a few. Longer-term, not-for-profit 
organizations facilitate the community recovery and recon-
struction process through the repair of minor community 
infrastructure, housing, and the restoration of livelihoods. 
Returning to the list of functions for which FEMA 
currently employs contractors, only few fall into the expertise 
of not-for-profit organizations. Not-for-profits generally do 
not provide support services such as communications, project 
evaluations, records management, administrative clerical and 
contracts services, security support services, media advertis-
ing, business consulting, and report support services among 
other functions. Not even some of what we may classify as 
FEMA’s core functions are activities that these organizations 
usually carry out, for example, snow removal or power grid 
and rail repair work, or even writing analytical and scientific 
reports and producing technical GIS products. 
But not-for-profits have built expertise and a reputation in 
other areas where FEMA is continuously looking for partners. 
Setting-up and maintaining mass shelters, conducting 
exercises and training courses, and providing emergency 
medical services are some of those areas. Still, the data show 
that for-profits are hired for these traditional humanitarian 
activities. For instance, in order to speed up the response to 
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA entered into five contracts to 
address specifically the large-scale emergency housing needs 
(FEMA 2005). The five contractors included the Shaw Group, 
Fluor Corporation, Bechtel National Inc., CH2M Hill, and 
Dewberry Technologies. All of them are for-profit compa-
nies. The following questions then arise: Why does FEMA 
still prefer outcontracting to for-profits for these tasks? 
Can for-profits in fact mobilize resources faster and more 
efficiently than not-for-profits, even those with comparable 
expertise? Clearly, many not-for-profits do not have a local 
presence everywhere and also have to boost their own capac-
ity in times of disaster. However, exactly this capability of 
being able to mobilize volunteers and community engage-
ment virtually instantaneously has been one of their distinct 
advantages. The fact that many not-for-profits have started 
resorting to for-profit contractors themselves is a clear indica-
tion of the rapidly changing environment of emergency 
management in the United States and globally. A combination 
of a growing myriad of stakeholders, multilayered commu-
nity, government and business interests, a private sector that 
offers increasingly competitive emergency services and 
equipment, as well as the complexities of technological 
advances pose challenges also to not-for-profits that extend 
beyond their capacities. For instance, the American Red Cross 
(ARC) explains in its 2010 Disaster Relief Program Review 
on the need to, at times, augment its own response capacity: 
“A disaster relief response requires a vast reserve of resources 
and volunteers. Managing these resources requires real estate, 
logistical support and vendor agreements that exceed local 
capabilities” (ARC 2011a, 12). In addition, the American 
Red Cross also issues calls for proposals for such services 
as feasibility studies (ARC 2011b). Although these examples 
are peripheral to the organization’s core operation and self-
implementation, it is important for the government to under-
stand what activities are subcontracted. Should not-for-profits 
now also start relying on for-profit vendors for some of their 
core activities—as is already the case in government and 
further discussed below with reference to the “hollow state”—
the government may as well work directly with those 
subcontractors instead. 
The data on currently active contracts issued by FEMA 
hint that some work could have been carried out by a not-for-
profit organization rather than the for-profit that eventually 
received the contract award. There may be a variety of 
reasons why a not-for-profit organization was not chosen—
including, possibly, that no not-for-profit applied for the 
contract, had sufficient organizational capacity to implement 
the contract, had a presence in a particular locale required for 
the contract, or that potential not-for-profits simply seized the 
moment of donor attention in times of disaster and appealed 
for direct funding instead of competing for a government 
contract. In these instances, FEMA would have had no choice 
but to employ a for-profit competitor. Available data do not 
provide conclusive insight into this decision-making process. 
Thus, these possible explanations require further study, which 
is beyond the scope of this article.
In summary, government now uses for-profit contractors 
in virtually every single functional area of emergency man-
agement. Flexibility and better cost-effectiveness seem to 
remain key arguments for their employment. In addition, the 
increasing need to meet specialized and time-limited demands 
in emergency services and the absence of sufficient human 
resources in government itself—as uncovered by the DHS 
Inspector General—facilitates a conducive environment for 
the privatization of the emergency management sector and 
the use of for-profit contractors specifically.
3 Government’s Use of Not-For-Profit 
Contractors
As the data on FEMA-issued contracts shows, the government 
also hires not-for-profit contractors to support emergency 
management activities. Although contracts with not-for 
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profits are proportionally virtually non-existent, FEMA 
appears to place an increasing emphasis on expanding its 
partnership base with the non-profit sector in ways other than 
by entering into contractual service agreements and in the 
spirit of the “Whole Community” approach. For instance, in 
2010 FEMA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
national organization Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster (VOAD) that is designed to improve communication 
and coordination. In the same year, FEMA enter into another 
agreement, this time with the Red Cross, that lays the founda-
tion for shared responsibilities in mass care response during 
emergencies. Fusing the expertise of both organizations, the 
agreement “will combine the strength of FEMA as a federal 
agency and the decades of Red Cross experience in providing 
mass care to people in need” (ARC 2010). In order to comple-
ment the discussion above on for-profits, the following ques-
tions further explore the status of not-for-profits as potential 
contractors for the government: What are the key arguments 
of proponents of not-for-profit contractors in emergency 
services? What are the main situations and functional areas 
where not-for-profit contractors are employed? And why, if 
their expertise is so overtly recognized by government itself, 
are they not preferred government contractors? 
In the United States, the legal status of non-profits is 
guided by tax laws under Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which stipulates that “The organization must 
not be organized or operated for the benefit of private inter-
ests, and no part of a section 501(c) (3) organization’s net 
earnings may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual.” Sylves (2008, 158) further explains “By 
definition, a voluntary not-for-profit organization is one that 
provides service to a community free of charge or for the 
minimal cost that is required to defray the cost of the service(s) 
furnished. Financial support for voluntary agencies is gener-
ally through donations, contracts, and grants.” FEMA (2011b) 
expands on this by clarifying that a non-governmental 
not-for-profit organization is: 
An entity with an association that is based on interests of its 
members, individuals, or institutions. It is not created by a 
government, but it may work cooperatively with government. 
Such organizations serve a public purpose, not a private 
benefit. Examples of NGOs include faith-based charity 
organizations and the American Red Cross. NGOs, including 
voluntary and faith-based groups, provide relief services 
to sustain life, reduce physical and emotional distress, and 
promote the recovery of disaster victims. Often these groups 
provide specialized services that help individuals with 
disabilities. NGOs and voluntary organizations play a major 
role in assisting emergency managers before, during, and 
after an emergency. 
Thus, these not-for-profit organizations can play three dis-
tinct roles vis-à-vis the government in times of emergencies 
and disasters: (1) they may be active on the ground through 
non-government funding and, at best, coordinate their efforts 
through stakeholder coordination mechanisms; (2) they may 
be active on the ground and participate in the operation with 
the assistance of FEMA grants; or (3) they may be active on 
the ground as a FEMA agent, employed by the government as 
a contractor. When hired for a contract, they have competed 
and have been selected for their expertise, track record, and 
capacity to manage the tasks at hand. In whichever of those 
three roles they participate in emergency-related activities, 
their organizational culture, human resources structure, and 
philanthropic objectives will not change, even when funding 
is now received through a government contract instead of 
through private donations. In fact, a non-profit often operates 
in the same emergency with different funding sources 
that may include a combination of governmental and non-
governmental financial support. Moreover, regardless of 
their funding source, non-profits remain accountable to their 
governing bodies—be it their membership or board—and the 
public they serve according to the organization’s mission 
statement. The same holds true for for-profits, whose organi-
zational structure and culture also does not change with the 
award of a government contract.
Consequently, the critical distinction between for-profit 
and not-for-profit contractors lies in their motivation and 
their corresponding work ethics. While not-for-profits work 
towards providing essential services for the “common good,” 
the primary concern of a for-profit is the profit margin. One 
of the most employed FEMA contractors, the Shaw Group, 
emphasizes in its Executive Compensation and Governance 
Overview (The Shaw Group Inc. 2012, 4) that “Our number 
one goal is to create long-term value for our shareholders. 
Through our pay for performance program, we are striving to 
align the interests of our corporate management with the 
interests of our shareholders.” Sylves (2008, 164) elaborates 
further that “government contractors, as profit-maximizing 
businesses, have an incentive to minimally meet the terms of 
the contract, nothing more. Some government contractors 
have been accused of being unresponsive to taxpayers or 
have been prosecuted for fraud and corruption.” By contrast, 
a not-for-profit equivalent with comparable expertise in 
the housing sector is, for example, Habitat for Humanity. Its 
mission is guided by the objective of “seeking to eliminate 
poverty housing and homelessness from the world and 
making decent shelter a matter of conscience and action” 
(Habitat for Humanity 2012). Furthermore, with a future 
homeowner’s own financial and manual labor contributions, 
“Habitat houses are sold to partner families at no profit 
and financed with affordable loans.” These two examples 
highlight the fundamentally diverging perception of account-
ability and objectives of for-profits and not-for-profits, which 
are important to understand when entering into contractual 
agreements for emergency services.
By outsourcing, government inevitably loses some degree 
of oversight, accountability, and transparency. When dealing 
with assistance to disaster-affected populations, not only 
speed and volume of service delivery is crucial but also 
quality and “best fit.” Consequently, beyond the specific pro-
visions of the project contract, knowledge of the community 
and the degree of a vested interest in the longer-term building 
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of community disaster resilience should also be a deciding 
factor for awarding contracts. This may help guard against 
an erosion of oversight and accountability resulting from 
outcontracting. Although not-for-profit organizations have 
not been immune from accusations of misuse of funds, the 
frequency and scale of contract fraud by for-profits have 
received particular attention. For instance, in the case of 
Hurricane Katrina, Trichur (2007, 231)—following the work 
of the government’s Fraud Task Force—concludes that while 
investigations have focused on fraud by emergency assistance 
recipients, “instances of corporate contract and procurement 
fraud have been documented at fifty times that amount. The 
Shaw Group and other politically connected corporations like 
Halliburton and Bechtel seized lucrative deals for clean-up 
and reconstruction without competition or oversight, while 
regional companies in desperate need of help were cut off 
from the bidding process.” 
For not-for-profits, shared principles of sustainability 
apply. For instance, activities of the American Red Cross are 
guided by the principles of its charter, which specifically 
tasks the organization with devising and integrating sustain-
able programs spanning the mitigation, preparedness, and 
response phases of the disaster management cycle. Habitat 
for Humanity—as Steve Weir, Vice President of Global 
Program Development and Support explains—pursues sus-
tainability as a holistic approach that incorporates “environ-
mental sustainability, family and community sustainability, 
and financial sustainability” (Weir 2012). All not-for-profit 
organizations operate under shared humanitarian principles, 
which for example include the do-no-harm principle that 
stipulates that no organization engaged in humanitarian 
assistance should act in a way that may worsen the situation 
of those they have come to help. Not-for-profit organizations 
work closely with the community and are generally focused 
on the sustainability of their activities. This is also the reason 
why many remain in the community beyond the immediate 
response phase and attempt to ensure a steady transition from 
relief to recovery. Their community work usually continues 
beyond a government contract where continued funding can 
be secured through other sources. 
By contrast, for-profit contractors have no interest in the 
community beyond their contractual work. Companies such 
as the Shaw Group, Fluor Corporation, Bechtel National Inc., 
CH2M Hill, and Dewberry Technologies also have a 
corporate culture of engaging in charitable initiatives for the 
communities in which they work. However, the difference is 
that those community support initiatives are peripheral to 
their organization’s core work. Thus, beyond time-limited 
contractual obligations, there are no comparable guiding prin-
ciples for these for-profits intended to promote community 
sustainability and, more specifically where they implement a 
contract for emergency-related activities, the longer-term 
building of community disaster resilience. Consequently, the 
motivation—or lack thereof—to engage with the community 
and find “best-fit” solutions for recovery is distinctly differ-
ent for not-for-profit and for-profit contractors. Government’s 
use of not-for-profit contractors may constitute another 
strategy to ensure that emergency-related activities are firmly 
integrated into a more comprehensive and ongoing process of 
community sustainability and resilience.
Furthermore, a successful disaster response and recovery 
is inevitably dependent on the degree of community involve-
ment. One of the approaches taken by not-for-profits during 
the initial response is to employ or otherwise engage the local 
community to the extent possible and then work towards the 
restoration of livelihoods long-term. Again, the principle of 
do-no-harm is applied, where non-profit organizations are 
committed inter alia to not distorting the local employment 
market and commodity prices by paying original local rates 
and working at local standards. For-profits do not adhere to 
these principles, employ and buy wherever “the price is right.” 
This was experienced by local economies in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, which had already 
suffered enormously when a cheap workforce descended on 
their communities after Hurricane Katrina—leaving uncom-
petitive local workers who had just lost their livelihoods with 
few opportunities to find a new job. This situation was further 
exacerbated by President Bush lifting the Davis-Bacon Act 
that sets a minimum wage for workers on federal contracts. 
Thus, those contractors who worked on behalf of FEMA 
in response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita were 
allowed by the Federal Government to employ workers at less 
than the 9 USD minimum wage in the region. President Bush 
justified his action by arguing that the wage rates imposed 
by the Act “increase the cost to the Federal Government 
of providing Federal assistance in these areas” and that the 
suspension “will result in greater assistance to these 
devastated communities and will permit the employment of 
thousands of additional individuals” (The White House 2005). 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) President John J. Sweeney (AFL-
CIO 2005), on the other hand, was outraged and countered: 
“Employers are all too eager to exploit workers. This is no 
time to make that easier. What a double tragedy it would be to 
allow the destruction of Hurricane Katrina to depress living 
standards even further.” Democratic Representative George 
Miller of California went further by accusing the Administra-
tion of exploiting this national tragedy by “awarding billion-
dollar no-bid contracts to cronies like Halliburton, but think 
that local workers in the Gulf struggling to get back on 
their feet after Katrina are being overpaid” (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2005). A week later in a letter of 13 Septem-
ber 2005, Miller and fellow members of Congress petitioned 
the Comptroller General on their concerns of government 
outcontracting in emergencies, which in their view benefited 
a few private companies through, among others, no-bid con-
tracts and on a cost-plus basis. They urged the Government 
Accountability Office to put into place more rigorous 
oversight measures in order to better protect the interests of 
beneficiaries and taxpayers. This example shows how power-
ful business interests in U.S. emergency management are and 
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how far they extend into the workings of government entities. 
Moreover, it is an example of the divergent ideological 
views that exist on the use of “profit” during humanitarian 
emergencies. 
Looking at the current practice of contract awards, U.S. 
emergency management provides a conducive environment 
for for-profit contractors. Arguments for the use of not-for-
profits include greater accountability to the affected popula-
tion as well as more appropriate services that incorporate 
longer-term strategies. Areas in which not-for-profits 
continue to remain successful are emergency relief services, 
including shelter, food, clothing, emergency medical aid, 
and psycho-social support, as well as longer-term community 
rebuilding and livelihood restoration.
4 Suggested Functional Areas for 
Government Contractors
The discussion above has highlighted where non-profit and 
for-profit contractors currently work, what key issues have 
provoked controversy over their engagement in emergency 
management, as well as what their respective strengths are. 
Although there are ideological and ethical arguments that a 
“for-profit” approach has no place in emergency management 
and that a “profit” should not be made on the misery of 
disaster-affected populations, the reality is that a disaster by 
definition overwhelms existing capacity, which is currently 
addressed by the U.S. government through the hiring of a 
range of contractors, mainly for-profits. 
The following table (Table 2) provides a suggestion as to 
which specific areas the two types of contractors—taking 
their respective expertise into consideration—may be best 
suited. These functional areas are examples from the list of 
currently issued FEMA contracts matched with the areas of 
expertise, as discussed above, by both for- and not-for-profits. 
The table does not constitute a complete list of all possible 
activities that may require the hiring of a contractor in case 
of a disaster. Also, as the Office of the Inspector General 
commented (DHS 2009), there are certain functions that 
should not only remain under the control of government but 
should also be carried out by government personnel them-
selves, primarily to guard against a conflict of interest but also 
to maintain appropriate oversight and accountability. For this 
reason, contractors should not be given responsibility for 
certain tasks, which would include, for instance, records 
management as well as administrative clerical and contract 
services.
5 The Future of Outcontracting 
in U.S. Disaster Management
As long as there is consensus that emergency management is 
a “shared national responsibility” (Roberts 2010, 43), which 
government is tasked to coordinate and guide, appropriate 
resources have to be available to meet this responsibility. In 
light of tighter government budgets in the foreseeable future, 
an increase in government personnel cannot be expected. 
Therefore, in addition to expanding stakeholder networks 
and non-governmental resources, entities such as FEMA will 
undoubtedly have to continue to rely on contractors to carry 
out core functions and boost capacity in times of national 
disasters. 
Roberts and others argue that this trend of outsourcing 
leaves a “hollow state” and, paradoxically, actually increases 
the need for government: “FEMA, like other agencies, con-
tributes to the “hollow state” by locating much of its capacity 
outside government, as when it enters into contracts with 
private firms to provide public services. These firms create a 
state within the state, a network of firms whose employees are 
not subject to government regulations but who perform func-
tions once carried out by federal employees . . . Privatization 
actually increases the need for government coordination 
(though not direct control) over the growing network of orga-
nizations responsible for emergency management” (Roberts 
2010, 59). It remains to be seen to what extent the “hollow 
state” is acceptable to the American public and the American 
taxpayer. 
Kirschenbaum (2004) and Handmer (2000) contend that 
the trend of outsourcing and privatizing has already created a 
private emergency management sector that has shifted the 
perception of “national responsibility” towards one of indi-
vidual choices. They believe that taking a business approach 
focused on demand and supply sets a process in motion that 
will more and more start focusing on actual individual needs 
and, thus, eventually serve disaster-affected communities 
better. The U.S. government practice of outsourcing has 
increased competition and led to a proliferation of private 
companies engaged in emergency equipment, technologies, 
and services. The effect has been a steady increase in the 
private sector taking over core governmental functions 
but also, at the same time, providing emergency services to 
individuals and businesses directly.
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Kirschenbaum (2004) carried out a study in Israel on 
consumer demand for emergency supplies and services, 
which were also provided by the government for free. In his 
investigation of the potential of privatizing the emergency 
management sector related to all phases of the disaster man-
agement cycle, Kirschenbaum (2004) concluded that the 
privatization of public sector disaster services was sensible 
as consumers regardless of their economic standing were 
prepared to pay for emergency equipment and services even 
if those were provided gratis by the government. The reasons 
for this appeared to range from more options in terms of 
selecting their preferred equipment or services to a perceived 
better quality.
Kirschenbaum’s study pertains to emergency management 
in a distinct security environment in Israel. Therefore, its 
findings are not easily transferable to other countries. But as 
privatization of emergency management is well underway 
also in the U.S., a similar study of American consumers would 
be helpful in gaining an insight into what types of equipment 
and services they would be willing to pay for themselves. 
This would provide an opportunity for government to recali-
brate its organizational framework of disaster management, 
refocus its resources, and provide only those services that 
individuals are not able to provide for themselves.
Moreover, as the complexity and economic losses of disas-
ters increase (UN 2011) and government resources with which 
to respond to the growing challenges become scarcer—thus, 
ultimately, placing a greater burden on individuals and local 
disaster management institutions—taxpayers are also likely 
to raise more questions about whether the profit approach to 
emergency management is indeed appropriate and effective. 
Ultimately, the issuing of contracts to both for-profits and 
not-for-profits will largely depend on what the government is 
able to afford and where its priorities lie. 
6 Conclusion
The U.S. Government is currently dependent on both 
for-profit and not-for-profit contractors in carrying out its 
responsibilities in emergency management. Both types of 
contractors have limitations in terms of their areas of exper-
tise. Therefore, government has to choose carefully when and 
where to employ either. The argument of more efficiency and 
better cost-effectiveness by for-profit contractors requires 
further research. Whether or not a for-profit disaster manage-
ment approach is acceptable from an ideological perspective 
is a matter of national consensus. The current prevailing 
ideology in the U.S. is in support of an expanding for-profit 
business model. In order to safeguard against conflicts of 
interest and ensure the most appropriate and sustainable 
assistance to disaster-affected communities, government 
needs to be vigilant in entering into contracts that adequately 
meet taxpayers’ expectations and longer-term community 
needs.
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